Samantha L. MILLER, Chrysostom’s Devil: Demons, the Will, and Virtue in Patristic Soteriology. Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2020. Pp. xviii + 198. $40.00 pb. ISBN 978-0-8308-4917-8. Reviewed by Benjamin BROWN, Lourdes University, Sylvania, OH 43560.

Chrysostom’s Devil offers a systematic explanation of the titular saint’s theology not only of the devil, but of humanity, salvation and the problem of evil as well.  Samantha Miller points out that Chrysostom discusses demons more often than just about any patristic figure.  In part this is because his audience thinks much about demons, and Chrysostom as a good pastor needs to help them understand matters correctly.  Most of his discussion of demons is practical, but he does have an undergirding theological framework that emerges at times.  Miller carefully draws out that theological framework for us.

Miller’s first chapter lays out Chrysostom’s many contexts: historical, literary, pagan, Jewish, and Christian.  His is a world replete with belief in good and bad spirits.  The second chapter examines his demonology.  Given what she finds, Miller then devotes the next chapter to Greco-Roman understandings of freedom and virtue, followed by a chapter on Chrysostom’s anthropology and another on his soteriology, both of which are integral to his demonology.

Like his congregations, Chrysostom holds that demons are real, substantial, spiritual beings bent on human destruction, but unlike them, he warns that demons are not that powerful, for two reasons: first, they can only do what God allows, and second, they cannot cause true injury.  Physical damage and temptations do not amount to true harm, namely the loss of God; that can only be caused by one’s own free choice to sin and abandon virtue.  Demons are powerless to make us do anything; they can merely tempt.  Thus Chrysostom’s theodicy and understanding of human nature, especially freedom, are deeply intertwined with his demonology.

Ultimately, evil is the result of misused freedom.  The angels were made good, but some rejected virtue, which Chrysostom describes in different ways in order to provide various object lessons for his listeners or readers.  Similarly, humans were made good, but chose evil.  Salvation is found in virtue, which is Christlikeness and union with Christ.  We lost it freely, and we can only regain it freely (referring to his adult audience, capable of free choice).  Thus salvation is a cooperative endeavor; while Christ provides what we cannot, Chrysostom emphasizes that we must freely receive and enact the proffered life of virtue.  Miller here discusses faith, grace, and works, making clear that we must no try to read St. John through the eyes of later debates; however, she recognizes his fundamentally cooperative view of salvation in which human free agency is essential, for by our virtue we will be “worthy of the kingdom.”

The book concludes with a couple suggestive contemporary practical applications.  Chrysostom can help us better distinguish true harm from only apparent (physical) harm and thus take demons seriously without attributing too much power to them.  Virtue is the important thing, which comes from our freedom.  This might help deliverance ministries not attribute so much power to demons and also chasten prosperity gospel proponents not to attribute so much importance to material blessings.  Job is Chrysostom’s regular example of avoiding both pitfalls.  Finally, we can learn not to blame the devil for our sins, but also not to “blame” God for our virtue, as if our freedom has nothing to do with it.  And whatever else we do, in our debates about salvation and all other issues, we should assiduously avoid demonizing our opponents.

While a revision of Miller’s dissertation, the book is conceptually easy to read for anyone with a little theological background, but its level of detail as well as its terminology, especially the use of untranslated Greek, sets is squarely on the scholar’s shelf, to which it is an excellent addition.