Robert Louis WILKEN, Liberty in the Things of God: The Christian Origins of Religious Freedom. Yale: New Haven, CT and London, 2019. Pp. x + 236. $26.00 hc. ISBN 978-0-300-22663-8. Reviewed by Benjamin BROWN, Lourdes University, Sylvania, OH 43560.

Freedom of religion and conscience have always been important topics, and will only become increasingly more so in the postmodern world that idolizes difference while condemning those who think differently about difference.  As worldview divergences and identity politics give rise to ever greater fissures in the social fabric, we are very much in need of a careful (re)thinking of the nature and interrelationships of freedom, conscience, the common good, and public order.  Liberty in the Things of God is a welcome contribution.

However one sees the issues playing out, what Wilken brings to the table is an explanation of how deeply the ideas of religious freedom and freedom of conscience are Christian ideas that arise in history primarily out of the Christian faith and experience.  Religious liberty is grounded not just philosophically and practically, but theologically as well.  That truth has largely been forgotten because it is usually thought that freedom of religion is a purely reason-based response to the attempts of religions themselves (Christian churches in particular) to impose belief.  Liberty in the Things of God shows how this is only partially true by documenting the rich tradition of Christian reflection that grounded the case for religious freedom.

The first chapter explains that throughout human history, including the Roman empire, religion was deeply enmeshed with every aspect of life.  There was no separation of “church and state.”  Christianity, however, from the beginning emphasized the importance of holding true beliefs and doing so in the depths of one’s mind, heart, and soul.  In the face of persecution, Christian apologists developed arguments for freedom of religion.  Tertullian and Lactantius feature prominently here and are cited by virtually every Western thinker on the topic afterward, until Locke.

Tertullian is the first in Western history to use the phrase “freedom of religion” (libertas religionis).  He argues that religion is about devotion to God, which can only be voluntary; coerced worship is no worship at all, but a mockery of piety.  Not even a human being would want to be worshipped unwillingly or paid only lip service; neither does God.  Further, humans are naturally free and therefore have a need and a right to operate as such, especially in the things of God.  While not by any means developing a theory of human rights, Tertullian grounds religious liberty in human nature that is common to all and belongs to all from God, not from human concessions.  Therefore, the empire has no imperium over religion.  He emphasizes the inwardness of religion; it comes from the mind and will.  However, it also necessarily springs forth into action; it is lived outwardly as well.  It should be noted that Tertullian is not thinking of individuals, but of communities, the right of religious bodies to govern themselves free from state coercion.

The second chapter examines the medieval period.  Coming into dominance, Christians (especially rulers) tended to want to impose unity of faith, and plenty of sins were committed in the name of conversion.  On the other hand, the principle of freedom of religion remained strong and rulers or mobs were regularly reminded that Saxons, Jews, etc. could not be forcibly baptized nor have their places of worship taken away.  St. Thomas in particular is important for articulating clearly the principle that conscience must always be obeyed.  Finally, the principle of the two swords also emerged, namely that there are two authorities that must remain distinct, the spiritual and the temporal

With the Protestant reformations, the unity of faith which Christendom possessed was destroyed, and the problem quickly emerged: how can we have a healthy commonwealth with multiple churches?  What can the magistrate require and what is beyond his purview?  What differences can be tolerated and on what grounds?  Chapters three through eight examine the situations of Germany, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and England.  These chapters show how the key principles established in early and medieval Christianity were adduced in everyone’s arguments, no matter the level of toleration each envisioned.
The final chapter examines several more key figures, culminating with John Locke.  Wilken’s assessment is that Locke offers nothing fundamentally new, except that his is not an overtly theological argument.  He does not cite any of the church fathers or prior theologians.  As the West moved more and more towards “reason alone”, Locke thus became the favored author and others were forgotten, though he uses the same arguments as his predecessors and contemporaries, who did ground their case theologically

ilken adeptly lays out the Christian foundations of religious freedom through the 17th century.  He does not offer many answers to the hard questions about the limits of government authority and religious freedom, but that is not his objective.  However, what little he does suggest (or assume) strikes me as too libertarian, as if there are no limits to religious freedom (180-81).  He also seems to overemphasize the inwardness of faith and suggest a certain dualism.  Finally, his presentation would have been improved by attention to the growing recognition that “religion” is a loaded, second-order term of Western secularist creation; there is no such thing as “religion” that can be identified and separated out from politics, economics, culture, etc.

ilken says that it should not surprise us that the concept of freedom of religion and conscience emerged from a culture deeply formed by the idea that having the right beliefs matters a lot.  One must wonder whether such freedom can survive in a culture that denies the existence of right beliefs at all.  This book, especially the first and last chapters, is a must read.